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Abstract 
 
The research item of the paper is the term "judicial corruption". This particular term was ignored in the 
majority of countries of the Council of Europe. Judicial corruption as a term was first mentioned in the PACE 
documents- Resolution 1703 (2010) on judicial corruption. The author is trying to give answer to the 
question- Could there be a balance between establishing the responsibility of the judge and the 
independence guarantees? The term judicial corruption should not be manipulated with, i.e. the criminal 
cases of corruption where the judges and prosecutors are involved should be proved and led in line with all 
ECHR Article 6 fair trial requirements, and in compliance with the principle for presumption of innocence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the course of implementing the fourth evaluation round, GRECO (Council of 
Europe, Group of States against corruption), did not consider the term “judicial 
corruption”, and this particular term was ignored in the majority of countries of the 
Council of Europe. Judicial corruption as a term was first mentioned in the PACE 
documents (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly) - Resolution 1703 (2010) on 
judicial corruption, however, it was not defined. Instead of considering this term, the 
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entire issue was reduced to the area of judicial ethics, promotion of judicial integrity and 
other. The newest PACE document Resolution 2098 (2016) states that:  
Judicial corruption severely impedes the protection of human rights, in 
particular judicial independence and impartiality. It also undermines 
public trust in the judicial process and infringes the principles of legality 
and legal certainty. Judicial corruption takes complex forms and 
comprises corruption related both to cases and to the career of a judge. 
Council of Europe member States must channel their efforts with regard 
to both of these aspects and provide effective mechanisms which allow 
for identification and investigation of cases of corrupt practices in the 
judiciary, and adequate sanctions for perpetrators (Council of Europe: 
Judicial corruption: urgent need to implement the Assembly’s 
proposals). 
 
Generally speaking, corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for 
private gain. That formulation ensures that both private and public corrupt practices are 
covered. Corruption can be individual or institutional. The term is not precisely defined 
in the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption. The forms of corruption evolve 
continuously. It goes further than paying or taking a bribe and encompasses a large 
range of acts and omissions including bribery, abuse of functions, and misappropriation 
of State funds, illicit enrichment, or trading in influence (UN Convention against 
Corruption, 2003). Integrity (Latin: Integritas) means “whole and complete”, synonyms 
are: honesty, decency, inseparability, sincerity, truthfulness, consistency of actions, 
values, methods, measures,  other moral values  of a person, who is not suspectable to 
corruption pressure and to whom the public interest is beyond her/his private interest. 
Transparency International defines judicial corruption as “misuse of the position 
for personal purposes, gain of tangible or intangible advantage, influence peddling for 
the purpose of speeding up or slowing down the court cases, trading with information” 
(Transparency International Corruption Index). Political corruption in the judiciary means 
political influence on decision making process, manipulation with appointments, 
allocation of cases, unfounded reassignment, politically motivated dismissals, realization 
of career ambitions. Transparency International defines judicial corruption as misuse of 
the position for personal purposes, gain of tangible or intangible benefit, influence 
peddling for the purpose of speeding up or slowing down the cases, information 
trading, etc. Most common case of political corruption is the political influence on 
judicial decision making, judicial election manipulation, allocation of cases, unfounded 
reassignment, as well as politically motivated dismissals.Political corruption appears in 
the form of realization of career ambitions or professional aspirations. The term judicial 
corruption should not be manipulated with, i.e. the criminal cases of corruption where 
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the judges and prosecutors are involved should be proved and led in line with all ECHR 
Article 6 fair trial requirements, and in compliance with the principle for presumption of 
innocence. For example in Macedonia in the case JUSTITIA, twelve  misdemeanour 
judges have been shown on breaking news in the media when entering the court 
building,  apprehended  by police officers, but recently, after seven years since the 
commencement of the procedute,  the first instance judge  has adopted a decision for 
their acquittal of accusation. 
From the few analyses and researches in this area, there is insufficient 
information for effectively completed cases of judicial corruption. It can be a result of 
two things: first, that such case do not exist, and second, that there is no available 
information on judicial corruption related cases. However, if insufficiencies exist in the 
legal frame and/or the perception indicators show lack of confidence with regards to 
judiciary, then one can conclude that the judicial corruption benefits from impunity and 
the entire system becomes subjected to corruption. ECtHR is cautious and prefers the 
conclusion that the there is lack of independence in the concrete case, rather then that 
the decision is a result of corruptive practices (Bratza 2014). Conducted GRECO 
evaluations related to the Fourth Round Evaluation (Prevention of corruption among 
parliamentarians, judges and prosecutors)(Council of Europe 2018), so far, show two 
categories of countries and legal systems, which, considering the specifics of the legal 
tradition, culture and mentality, lead to different systems for determining the 
responsibility of the judges when it comes to violation of ethics. The first are the so-
called “old democracies”, where the judges are still elected by the legislative or 
executive authority; they have no strict regulations and criteria for election, promotion, 
evaluation, distribution of cases, and no system for conflict of interests, asset 
declarations or even lack of written ethical rules. Still, there is perception of long 
historical public trust and respect in the judiciary, strong social control, low number of 
dismissed judges, developed system of judicial transparency, self-control of the ethical 
violations, developed system for reporting violations of ethical principles, high level of 
integrity. On the other hand, there are the countries of “new democracies” aspirers for 
EU accession and the new EU member states, which adopted all international anti-
corruption standards, but have weak implementation, existing low perception level of 
trust and high disrespect of judges among citizens., high number of dismissed judges, 
subjected to disciplinary procedures which are often criticised as a method for political 
rooting out of disobedient judges. 
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FIST LEVEL DIRECTED TOWARDS IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE CODE OF ETHICS 
 
In the reports adopted so far, GRECO recommended the judiciary to detect the 
risks of conflict of interests and corruption by itself and show its capability for handling 
thereof. The judiciary can do that by implementing the given recommendations for 
establishing advisory bodies within the judiciary, which is in compliance with all 
documents of the Council of Europe and the Opinions of the Consultative Council of 
European Judges (CCJE), with regards to the implementation of the ethical rules 
(Council of Europe 2018). That is the first step towards self-discovery and self-detection 
of the responsibility for violation (or possibility for violation) of the ethical rules in form 
of self-reporting by the judge. The judges should be able to address their problem to 
the advisory body which will provide reliable advice in a confidential manner, whereby 
the good practices will be compiled and published in order to serve to other judges as a 
guide for application of the code. In addition, several problematic issues are addressed: 
how to elect a body constituting of judges with the best virtues in their personal and 
professional life, lacking any perceived or actual conflict of interests, highly respected in 
the so-called “judicial community” where the judges are fully trusted when it comes to 
sharing ethical dilemmas. It should perform its functions according to the highest 
discretion and confidentiality level with clear distinction of the competences between 
the said body and the disciplinary body. Another problems could be whether the case 
will be under the competence of the disciplinary body, whether the reported conduct 
presents less or more severe violation of the ethical rules, the danger of prejudice and 
personal feelings of sympathy, aversion, which impairs the impartiality of the entire 
process. This mechanism can transfer into a system, only in an atmosphere and culture 
of transparency, mutual trust, respect and discretion among the judges. 
 
Example of Good Practice 
 
The Judicial Conference of the US Committee on Codes of Conduct deals with 
the confidential advising of judges in the daily implementation of the ethical principles. 
These opinions are advisory and published anonymously on its website. Some of the 
advices refer to the possible service on Governing Boards of NGO; disqualification 
where long-time friend or friend’s law firm Is counsel; acceptance of hospitality and 
travel expense reimbursements from lawyers; membership in a political club; 
disqualification based on stockholdings by household family member , commenting on 
legal issues arising before the Governing Board of a Private College or University ; 
participation in fund raising for a religious organization; service on Governing Board of 
a Public College or University; acceptance of public testimonials or awards. Appearance 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 4, No. 1, 2018 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com 
            
 
 
 119 
before a legislative or executive body or official, political involvement of a judge’s 
spouse; extrajudicial writings and publications; use of title “Judge” by former judges, gifts 
to newly appointed judges; use of electronic social media by judges and judicial 
employees (“Published Advisory Opinions”. United States Courts 2018). 
 
Responsibility of the Judges and Functional Immunity 
 
When the responsibility of the judge is established, one must not invade the 
merit – content of the judicial persuasion and the inherent view, since the judges are not 
subjected to responsibility of the matters expressed in the decision, views i.e. what they 
decide on in judicial capacity. The interpretation of laws, measurement and weighing of 
evidence or assessment of facts must not be connected with criminal, civil or disciplinary 
responsibility, with the exception of cases of malice or rough negligence. Therefore, one 
must establish what is judicial reasoning and decision and their extent, which is quite 
difficult task. In the Concept of Law, the legal positivist H. L. A. Hart says that: 
The judges must make a choice which is neither arbitrary nor mechanical, 
whereas the judicial values leave their mark, such as independence, 
neutrality in the search of alternatives, taking account of all affected 
parties and giving explained reasons for the decision. The decision cannot 
be exceptionally well-judged; it can only be acceptable as explained, 
reasonable product of informed and impartial choice (Hart 2014).  
 
The boundaries of judicial reasoning are limited and due to such reason the 
decisions are controlled via legal remedies which correct the intentional and 
unintentional errors of the judges. In general, the errors are considered as unwitting 
acts. The international documents do not determine the terms judicial error, fallacies, 
intentional violation of law, professional/ethical duties, intentional and rough oversights 
thoroughly, which will facilitate the definition of the limits marking the commencement 
of establishing the responsibility of the judge. On the other hand, that increases the risk 
of their arbitrary interpretation by the ones determining the level of guilt, qualification of 
violations, evidence and facts that will be gathered, and the questions raised as to their 
independence, expertise, personal and political affiliations, political background, 
prejudices, reasoning and logic, which may invade the merit of the decision and the 
persuasion of the judge. Clear definition of “performing judicial duties” is crucial, since it 
presents a basis for responsibility – for the conduct and acts conducted beyond the 
performance of the judicial function, the judges are subjected to responsibility as any 
other citizen). It should be distinguished when the judge is on duty and what the true 
meaning of professional performance of duties is. That is the time when the judge 
performs all activities related to official actions and process authorizations.  
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However, it is a fact that the judges are subjected to the code of ethics with 
regard to the profession, not only during the performance of their official actions, but 
also beyond their working hours (some say that they play the role of a judge 24/7). 
Other fact is the establishing of malice or rough negligence, clear definition and 
pronouncing of the acts of disciplinary violation, existence of clearly defined procedure 
with all procedural guarantees in front of non-political body(this term is introduced in 
the 2016 Action Plan of the Committee of Ministers, which is disputable in case of 
existence of different systems for election of bodies competent for solving the status 
issues of judges).The sanctions must apply proportionally and not be pronounced out of 
arbitrary or political motives (Action plan, Council of Europe 2016). 
 
SUMMARY ANALYSIS FROM THE COMPARATIVE PRACTICE OF  
THE GRECO FOURTH EVALAUTION ROUND REPORTS WITH REGARDS TO  
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF JUDGES 
 
The disciplinary responsibility applies to violation of ethical (e.g. 
incompatibilities) or professional duties. In some countries, the violations of ethical rules, 
such as less or more severe offence, are deemed as disciplinary violations. The violations 
are divided in two levels (less and more severe) or in three categories of offences, petty 
offence, less severe offence and more severe offence. The ethical violations may be 
included in all three categories, depending on the type of conduct. In some countries, 
there is an attempt for distinguishing the violations of ethical rules from the violations of 
professional duties, even though they are often confused; as well as the less and more 
severe ethical violations, due to their valuable importance and evaluation of the ethics 
according to the culturological, social and legal tradition – in many cases, it seems that 
they are just listed on a paper and therefore, glossaries, manuals and instructions are 
needed for everyday use; furthermore, the ethical and professional violations are not 
clearly distinguished from the appellate bases, thus creating additional danger from 
arbitration. Professional violations refer to violations related to timely schedule of 
hearing, timely decision making and writing, wrong decision, non-performance of other 
official duties, severe violation of provision of substantive or procedural law, lack of 
decision explanation, intentional non-reporting of conflict of interests and property are 
deemed as more severe violations of the discipline or due to severe negligence. Ethical 
violations refer to conduct harming the institution image, alcohol consumption, acts 
discrediting the personal reputation and the reputation and authority of the court, 
violation of ethical principles with regards to clients, colleagues, president of court and 
personnel, experts, prosecutors and lawyers, harm caused to the dignity and function, 
conduct endangering the trust in independent, impartial, professional and fair decision 
making by the courts. 
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Criminal responsibility - refers to criminal acts such as incriminations of bribe, 
authorization misuse and unauthorized disclosure of secret and confidential 
information. In some of the countries, the judges do not enjoy any immunity. In other 
countries, there is a criminal responsibility for involvement in conflict of interests and 
distortion of justice for the benefit or to the detriment of one of the clients (perverting 
the course of justice). 
Civil responsibility – the judges cannot have civil responsibility for a damage 
caused to one of the clients, as a result of judicial error or civil responsibility for 
individual court decisions; however, there is a possibility for damage claim in case of 
intentional damage or severe negligence. 
Immunity - GRECO has a sound view that the judges should enjoy protection 
from unfounded intrusions during the performance of their duties and therefore, they 
are granted with so-called functional immunity. However, at the same time for the 
purpose of implementing the 20 Guiding Principles on fight against corruption 
(Committee of Ministers, Council of Europe 1997), the immunity of judges should be 
limited to activities referring to their participation in the judiciary administration. The 
functional immunity must not be perceived as unlimited right of the judges and must 
not create the impression of judges as untouchable, and the deprivation of the 
immunity is necessary for the purpose of prosecution when the decision is a result of 
criminal act. With regards to the issue about the status and reputation of a judge 
deprived of immunity, we have a case where, upon the request of the Special Public 
Prosecutor's Office, a procedure was initiated for criminal act with reference to decisions 
adopted by administrative judges in the electoral process, the Judicial Council deprived 
the judges of their immunity, and the said judges have recently again decided on the 
occasion of the new local election. The term of reputation risk has been introduced by 
the “Deloitte” the brand dealing with creating management risk plans for large 
companies, states that the company’s reputation is perhaps its most valuable asset and 
has the leading role among risks  and is named as killer of the values. The massage for 
everyone who produces and sells values, must seriously take care of its reputation and 
the danger to which it is exposed. Extreme cases may even lead to bankruptcy (as in the 
case of Arthur Andersen). Recent examples of companies include: Toyota, Goldman 
Sachs, Oracle Corporation, NatWest. The measures for establishing the responsibility 
must not be taken for the purpose of repressions and vengeance towards the judges for 
particular political decision. Most of the ECHR judgments refer to violation of freedom of 
expression, referred to in Article 10 of ECHR, in cases where the judges publicly criticized 
particular conditions in the judiciary, for which disciplinary procedures were initiated 
against them and they were dismissed from their function (Baka v. Hungary, Kudeshkina 
v. Russia, Volkov v. Ukraine, Harabin v. Slovenia). 
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THE SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA 
 
For the period of 10 years (2006-2016), 15 applications were stopped, 1 rejected, 
44 judges were dismissed, 1 application was rejected, only 1 fine was pronounced for 
disruption of interpersonal relations, 2 for lustration, and out of all dismissed judges only 
4 are appellate judges, of whom two presidents, and the others are judges and 
presidents of basic courts who, in some of the cases, are dismissed for actions in many 
cases or actions in one case only. In the last two years, 5 procedures were initiated.  
In 4 cases, ECHR decided that Article 6 was violated in the course of leading 
disciplinary procedure. We can come to the conclusion that there are obvious reasons 
and presumable (hidden) reasons. In the disciplinary decisions some characteristic 
reasons are specified which may indicate doubt of corruption and payment purposes, 
such as decision making by one individual instead of the council, awarding property to 
the detriment of the country, making two decisions in one case and disappearance of 
the case, non-submission of fines for collection, obsoleteness of great number of 
misdemeanour cases, decisions for revocation of detention without having legal 
conditions, provisioning of passport, procrastination of investigation procedures, 
judging the wrongly accused person, while the real perpetrator escaped, judging in 
cases where the spouse is forensic scientist, etc. If one monitors the further conduct of a 
dismissed judge (they became lawyers, professors, found a job in the politics), one can 
conclude that there are indications about their former connections; however, these are 
only indications and speculations. Among the judicial community there are doubts 
about the honour of particular judges related to sharing money with lawyer's offices, 
nepotism in the relations between the judge and lawyers – relatives, violation of the 
rules for public procurement, non-exemption in case of having legal or other basis, 
public – private partnership for procurement of computer and other equipment for the 
courts, corruption of foreign projects which are hard to prove, decisions for the benefit 
of the interests of the political parties, business, lobbying connections.  
Only in two cases where severe violation of the code of ethics was established, 
the judges were effectively judged for crimes, one for taking bribe and the other for 
unconscientiously work while holding an official positioning all other cases of judge 
dismissal, many violations were combined for unconscientiously and unprofessional 
performance of the judicial duties and violation of the code of ethics, and in particular 
cases they were mixed, whereby in one case the prejudiced leading of the procedure for 
the benefit of one client was deemed as violation of the code of ethics, in combination 
with other acts of unconscientiously and unprofessional performance of the judicial 
duties. In other case, violation of the principles for impartial treatment of the clients was 
established, which action was not classified as violation of the code of ethics, meaning 
that there are differences in the classification of the actions.  
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In other case, severe violation of the court reputation and judicial function was 
established; however, the action was not classified as violation of the code of ethics. In 
one particular case, the non-pronouncing of judicial decisions and non-preparation of 
written decisions within the give deadline was deemed as violation of the code of ethics, 
while in other cases that was deemed as unconscientiously and improper performance 
of the judicial duties.  
Not all of the judges against whom procedures were initiated are suspended, 
and this fact leaves the clients, whose cases are submitted to those particular judges, 
with the impression of selectivity and uncertainty. In particular cases, under one and the 
same basis, some of the judges are dismissed, while for other judges the procedures are 
stopped, which creates a confusion and doubt for possible selectivity of the disciplinary 
body. All of this should be subject to a thorough analysis; however, it is a fact that the 
specified decisions indicate that the Judicial Council does not fulfil the preventive 
function and allows the problem to escalate to the extent where the only solution is 
dismissal of the judge. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Could there be a balance between establishing the responsibility of the judge 
and the independence guarantees? We deem that the hardest task in the process of 
establishing the responsibility is not to invade the merit of the case, since the clues for 
existence of doubt for some kind of messiness in the work of the judges appear once 
the decision is made and pronounced, when the clients can inspect the reasons and 
explanation (and rationality).  
In most of the cases, disciplinary violations refer to unconscientious and 
unprofessional performance of duty, and the actual reasons are not always “obvious”. In 
most of the cases, upon the initiation of disciplinary procedure against judges, they 
“ingenuously” resign their position in order to avoid the presentation of evidence for 
establishing the actual reason for their dismissal, so that they can appear innocent to 
the public, which on the other hand causes anger and demotivation of the majority of 
honourable judges. Hence, it is difficult to determine whether the judges are dismissed 
due to their corruptive conduct, since only in small number of cases referring to the 
dismissal of judges a criminal procedure was initiated, whereby, considering the 
presumption of innocence, the circumstances related to the corruptive conduct of 
several judges remain in the lobby, and that hypocrisy eventually creates perception of 
persistence and protection of the corruption of the judges and non-existence of the will 
for judicial resolution of the case.  
On the other hand, when the actual reasons are not presented, some of the 
judges play the role of political victims of vengeance for adopting particular decision, 
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which once again creates a bad image of the judiciary.When the actual reasons are not 
transparent, some of the judges play the role of political victims of revenge for adopting 
particular decision, which once again creates a bad image of the judiciary (5 of them 
applied for the post of General Public Prosecutor - no rules for cooling period).  
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